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Abstract
If learning and teaching were easy, the whole world would be de-
veloped and frontier knowledge would spread quickly. But learning
is difficult and there is a finite capacity for teaching. The concept of
a knowledge-diffusion “bottleneck” can be used to explain why there
is a negative correlation between per-capita income growth rates and
fertility rates, especially amongst countries that are in the early stages
of industrialization. It can also explain why income distributions in
rich countries have power-law tails (both upper and lower) and why
income growth rates are independent of scale. A simple model of
knowledge diffusion is calibrated to the observed paths of structural
transformation in newly-industrializing countries. The resulting pa-
rameters are found to be consistent with the tail exponents seen in U.S.
income data, suggesting a common mechanism of knowledge diffusion
operating in developing countries and fully-developed countries.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly agreed that economic growth is driven by knowledge accumu-
lation. Increases in knowledge lead to increases in productivity. Knowledge
accumulation occurs in two steps, the first being the creation of new ideas,
and the second being the diffusion of those ideas to other people. Intuition
would suggest that the first step is the key to growth, but this paper ar-
gues that knowledge diffusion is actually more important. It is important
because it leads to the spread of productivity improvements. It is also im-
portant because it enables the creation of new ideas, as innovators stand on
the shoulders of past innovators. It follows that the speed of diffusion drives
the growth rate of an economy.
In the case of developing countries, new ideas likely originate from outside
the country and are then spread internally, so it is plausible that growth
is driven by knowledge diffusion.1 In the case of fully-developed countries,
the argument for why growth is mainly driven by knowledge diffusion is as
follows.
Innovation is difficult. But if many people are making the attempt simultane-
ously, some of them succeed, even if by luck. Suppose there is a mechanism of
knowledge diffusion that favors good ideas. In that case innovations spread,
and once they do, other people inevitably discover new ideas that build upon
the previous discoveries. This mechanism of growth does not require the ex-
istence of geniuses performing heroic acts of innovation. Nor does it require
large investments in R&D. Innovation can be small-scale and random. It can
even be noise (including noise having zero mean impact on productivity).
If noise is passed through a filter of rational imitation, the economy grows
(Staley, 2011, Luttmer, 2012).2
The central message of this paper is that there is a knowledge-diffusion “bot-
tleneck” that determines the growth rates of both industrializing countries
and developed countries. To motivate that message, let us look at two em-
pirical facts that are suggestive of a bottleneck. The first is the observed
1Jones & Romer (2010) state that “For some reason - perhaps because the diminishing
returns to capital in a production function are much easier to measure than the process of
technology adoption - the idea explanation for catch-up growth is not as well-established
as it probably should be.”
2The Luttmer and Staley models are based on a model of diffusion developed by Alvarez
et al. (2008) and Lucas (2009a).
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Figure 1: The number of workers in non-agricultural sectors in China. The best-
fit line uses data from 1978 onwards. Source: Penn World Table Version 9.0, ILO,
and author’s calculations.
historical pattern of structural change in China (that country being a promi-
nent example of a newly-industrializing country). The second is the shape of
the income distribution in the United States (that country being the leading
developed country). It will be argued that these two facts are linked by a
common bottleneck parameter.
Figure 1 shows the number of workers in non-agricultural sectors in China by
year from 1962 to 2014. The numbers have been compiled using employment
data from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al, 2015) along with sector
composition data from the U.N. International Labour Organization (ILO).3
The line is slightly convex, and an exponential function fits the data quite well
after 1978 (the start of reforms). The estimated growth rate is 3.8% per year.
The population growth rate in China during the reform years was on average
only 1% per year, so more than two thirds of the growth seen in Figure 1
must have been due to migration of workers from the agricultural sector.
That pattern is consistent with the idea of development in a dual-sector
economy. Workers migrate from a Traditional Sector (mostly subsistence
3www.ilo.org/ilostat.
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agriculture) to a Modern Sector (mostly manufacturing and services).4
The shape of the curve in Figure 1 is consistent with many convex functions,
but the exponential function lends itself to easy interpretation in terms of
knowledge diffusion. It implies that the rate of absorption of new workers in
the Modern Sector is proportional to the number of workers already there. To
see how such a proportionality might arise, consider a Modern Sector consist-
ing of workers and managers. It is plausible that some constant percentage
of the workforce is skilled enough to be a manager, and managers have a
finite span of control. Hence there is a limit to the number of migrants from
the traditional sector that can be hired and trained during a given unit of
time. Alternatively, imagine that knowledge transmission occurs in a formal
education sector. Some percentage of the modern workforce has the aptitude
to be a teacher, and there is a limit to the number of students each teacher
can handle. Both of these mechanisms of teaching imply that the rate of
entry of migrants should be proportional to the number of workers already
in the Modern Sector.5
We can formalize the above by writing
dNM
dt
= (γ − δ)NM , (1)
where NM is the number of workers in the Modern Sector, γ is the absorption
rate, and δ is the mortality rate. The absorption parameter γ captures the
rate of education of newborns and migrants together. The average adult
mortality rate in China from 1978 to 2014 was δ = 0.6% per year.6 Using
the observed growth rate of 3.8% per year, we can rearrange Equation (1) to
obtain
γ = 3.8% + 0.6% = 4.4% per annum.
4Lewis (1954) introduced the dual-sector theory of development. Kuznets (1955) sup-
ported that model based on observed income inequality in developing countries. More
recently, Young has emphasized the role of migration in explaining the economic data for
the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and for China (Young,
1995, 2003; see also Hsieh, 2002 and Krugman, 1994).
5This picture is consistent with Lucas (1990) who suggested that knowledge accumu-
lation may be the limiting ingredient in economic development. It is also consistent with
the idea that cities act like ports for the importation of knowledge, and there is an ur-
ban agglomeration bottleneck that limits the spread of that knowledge to the rest of the
country (Lucas, 2009b).
6Mortality data is available from data.worldbank.org.
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Figure 2: A stylized distribution of income. Both axes are log scale. The density
is the number of workers per unit of log income.
Of course Equation (1) cannot be true forever because the supply of tradi-
tional workers eventually dries up. The parameter γ must eventually decline
until it is equal to the birth rate. A more complete model of development
must incorporate a process of deceleration as a country becomes fully mod-
ern. In other words, diminishing returns to the accumulation of human cap-
ital must eventually set in. But in the early stages of industrialization there
are, in the words of Lewis (1954), “unlimited supplies of labour”, hence no
diminishing returns.
Let us now consider a second empirical fact, the shape of the income distri-
bution in the United States. At first glance, the shape of the U.S. income
distribution would seem to have nothing to do with the pattern of structural
transformation in China. But the two facts can be linked conceptually and
numerically using the idea of a knowledge-diffusion bottleneck.
It has been known since the time of Pareto that the right tail of the U.S. in-
come distribution follows a power law with negative exponent (Pareto, 1896).
In 1953 Champernowne proposed a model that generates a power law also
in the left tail (Champernowne, 1953). Reed (2001, 2003) and Toda (2011,
2012) have recently confirmed Champernowne’s prediction. The entire dis-
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tribution has an asymmetrical “double-Pareto” shape (the left tail is thicker
than the right tail). Figure 2 shows a stylized double-Pareto distribution,
similar to what is seen empirically.7
One way to generate a double-Pareto distribution for income is to combine
knowledge diffusion along the lines discussed above for China with random
shocks to income. The mechanism works as follows.
Imagine that some percentage of people per unit time wish to upgrade their
knowledge. Assuming rationality, they seek the teacher with the most pro-
ductive knowledge. That teacher has a finite capacity for teaching. Once
that teacher fills up his or her “classroom”, students seek the teacher with
the next most productive knowledge, and so on. A long as the parameters
describing this process satisfy some reasonable conditions, the end result is
that some upper portion of the income distribution contains enough teachers
to accommodate students from across the entire income distribution. All
learning then takes place in the upper portion of the income distribution,
which we can call the “learning zone”.
When random income shocks are added to the above model of diffusion, two
things happen. First, the distribution takes on the form seen in Figure 2.
The downward-sloping part of the distribution on the right is the learning
zone, similar to the Modern Sector in a developing country. The upward-
sloping part of the distribution on the left is similar to the Traditional Sector
in a developing country.
The second thing that happens is that the distribution moves to the right
at a constant speed. Motion is seen even when the mean of the stochastic
productivity shocks is zero. That behavior is reminiscent of the behavior
described in Staley (2011) and Luttmer (2012, 2015). The distribution of
income forms a so-called traveling wave in which the shape is maintained
and moves to the right, mimicking economic growth.
One of the parameters of the above-described model is the rate at which
workers can be absorbed into the learning zone. It is similar to the parameter
γ described earlier. When the model of traveling-wave growth is calibrated
to the observed power-law exponents reported by Toda (2014) and to the
7See also Toda & Walsh (2015), Toda (2017). Ko¨nig et al (2016) show that the dis-
tribution of firm productivity is also double-Pareto, suggesting a link between income and
firm productivity. Alfaranoa et al (2012) find that both tails of the distribution of firm
profit rates also follow power laws.
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observed growth rate of income in the U.S., the absorption parameter takes
on the value 4.2% per year. That number is close to the value of γ for China
(4.4% per year).
The near coincidence between the absorption rate in the traveling-wavemodel
for the U.S. and the absorption rate in the dual-sector model for China sug-
gests a common mechanism of knowledge diffusion. This paper presents a
unified model of growth and development based on a simple mechanism of
learning. The model has three parameters: γ, which has already been dis-
cussed, a parameter β describing the rate at which people seek new teachers,
and a parameter σ describing the volatility of productivity shocks.
A striped-down version of the model using only γ and β is constructed for the
purpose of describing knowledge-transmission in a dual economy. Structural
transformation occurs because workers migrate from the Traditional Sector
to the Modern Sector, picking up knowledge from workers in the Modern
Sector. It turns out that over 90% of the historical variance of structural
transformation rates in countries that have industrialized since World War
II can be explained by this model.
The model predicts that during the early stage of industrialization there
is a strong negative correlation between the structural transformation rate
(and by extension the growth rate of per-capita income) and the fertility
rate. That prediction is supported by the data. China has been helped by
the one-child policy. The Philippines has been hindered by high fertility.
The intuition is that during the early stage of development there is a severe
learning bottleneck in the Modern Sector. If a country’s fertility rate is high,
many children do not gain access to productive knowledge when they grow up
because there are not enough “teachers” available for them in the Modern
Sector, so they are stuck in the Traditional Sector. The higher the birth
rate, the more young people are stuck, which results in a low rate of income
growth at the aggregate level. The model also predicts that once the size
of the Modern Sector reaches a certain threshold, the bottleneck is broken
and the process of structural transformation is no longer held back by high
fertility. That prediction is also supported by the data.
When stochastic productivity shocks are added to the model via the param-
eter σ, a solution describing steady-state growth is admitted. The income
distribution takes on the shape of a double-Pareto distribution and the dis-
tribution moves as a solid mass, i.e. as a traveling wave. When the three
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parameters are calibrated to the shape and speed of the log-income distri-
bution in the U.S., the resulting values of γ and β are close to the values in
the dual-economy model. That is the main result of this paper. It suggests
that there is a common mechanism of knowledge diffusion driving growth in
industrializing countries and fully-developed countries.
A prediction of the steady-state growth model is that the rate of growth of
per-capita income is given by
g = σ
√
2(γ − b), (2)
where b is the fertility rate. Equation (2) predicts a negative correlation
between the income growth rate and the fertility rate. The intuition behind
that result is that even in fully-developed countries there is a learning bot-
tleneck. The more new people there are seeking teachers, the larger is the
learning zone. Hence the vertex of the inverted ‘V’ in Figure 2 is located
further to the left, which in turn means that the average gain in productivity
per unit time is lower.
The U.S. has likely been on a steady-state growth path for some time, making
it ideal for testing Equation (2) using historical data. It so happens that the
growth rate of real per-capita GDP has been gradually increasing since the
early 1800s, while the fertility rate has been slowly declining over that same
period of time. It is shown in this paper that those two shifts are consistent
with Equation (2).8
The final prediction of the steady-state growth model is a limited scale ef-
fect. One might expect to see a positive correlation between the number of
workers and the growth rate of income. The more people there are, the more
discoveries are being made. A simulation exercise shows that this is indeed
the case for the steady-state growth model, but only for small populations.
As the population grows, the scale effect becomes weaker, until it eventually
disappears. For modern developed countries, the prediction is that there is
no discernible scale effect, in agreement with observation. The intuition for
this result is that the finite speed of diffusion puts a brake on the rate of
8In a somewhat related vein, Fwyrer (2011) suggests that the entry of the baby boomers
into the workforce in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the slowdown in productivity
growth during those decades. He postulates that the slowdown occurred partly because
the average quality of management declined as lower-quality managers were required to
handle the influx of young workers. That decline is analogous to a leftward shift of the
vertex in Figure 2.
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absorption of new ideas. As a result, there is some duplication of discoveries,
or “stepping on toes”, as Bloom et al. (2017) put it.
Much of the recent literature on diffusion-based models of growth is inspired
by Lucas (2009a), who models heterogeneous agents with differing levels
of productivity. Lucas shows that knowledge diffusion between agents can
be an engine of growth. His paper has triggered several modifications and
elaborations. Two representative examples are Lucas & Moll (2014) and
Perla & Tonetti (2014), who expand Lucas’s model by incorporating opti-
mal choosing between producing and imitating. In those models, and in
Lucas (2009a), growth eventually stops unless the distribution of productiv-
ities has an infinitely long right tail. Steady-state growth requires that all
productivity-enhancing discoveries have already been made.
Working independently, Staley (2011), Luttmer (2012, 2015) and Ko¨nig et al
(2016) have introduced stochastic productivity shocks into models of knowl-
edge diffusion, showing that steady-state growth can persist even when the
initial distribution of productivity is bounded. In the case of Staley and
Luttmer the productivity shocks are Brownian, while in Ko¨nig et al the
shocks are jumps on a Schumpeterian quality ladder. Hongler et al (2016)
expand Staley and Luttmer’s model by introducing an imitation neighbor-
hood. They show that there is a critical imitation strength above which
steady-state growth is possible.
Luttmer (2015) models stochastic innovation and knowledge transmission
between students and teachers. Students with different capacities for learning
are optimally matched to teachers having different levels of productivity. A
simplification of the model leads to a growth formula similar to (2). The
present model is similar to Luttmer’s model but abstracts from the details of
student-teacher assignments and pursues a more phenomenological modeling
approach.9 The present model also incorporates demographics, makes a link
with structural transformation in developing countries, and can capture the
thick left tail seen in U.S. data. In summary, the main contributions of the
present paper are:
• providing an explanation of why high fertility rates hinder the rates of
9A phenomenological model is based on parsimony and goodness of fit to empirical
data rather than on fundamental principles. It is hoped that such a model is consistent
with fundamental principles.
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structural transformation in developing countries in early years but not
in later years,
• providing a explanation of the asymmetric double-Pareto shape of in-
come distribution seen in the U.S.,
• suggesting how the increase in the income growth rate in the U.S. over
the last 200 years may have been due to the decline in fertility,
• discussing the bounded scale effect first pointed out by Staley (2011),
• and finally, showing quantitatively that knowledge diffusion is a promis-
ing basis for a unified theory of growth and development.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a simple two-parameter
model of learning applicable to structural transformation in industrializing
countries is presented. The two parameters γ and β are calibrated to cross-
country employment-share data, and the demographic implications are ex-
plored. Section 3 develops a diffusion-based model of steady-state growth
consistent with the structural transformation model, using the same two pa-
rameters γ and β, and incorporating stochastic productivity shocks through
a third parameter σ. Consistency with the dual-economy model is demon-
strated. The demographic and scale implications of the steady-state growth
model are explored. Finally, Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2 A Dual-Economy Model of Development
This section presents a simple two-parameter model describing the transmis-
sion of knowledge between two groups of people. The model is useful for two
reasons. First, it builds intuition that will prove useful in constructing a more
complex model of income dynamics. Second, it has application to the process
of development in a dual-sector economy. The model can explain much of
the pattern of structural transformation in countries that have successfully
industrialized since World War II.
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2.1 The Model
Consider an economy consisting of two sectors. One of the sectors, labeled
“Traditional”, contains workers that have low productivity and low income.
The other sector, labeled “Modern”, contains workers that have high pro-
ductivity and high income. Workers migrate from the Traditional Sector to
the Modern Sector, acquiring knowledge from those already in the Modern
Sector and thereby increasing their productivity and income.
Consider the situation where the Modern Sector is small compared with the
Traditional Sector. Repeating Equation (1) from the Introduction,
dNM
dt
= (γ − δ)NM , (3)
where NM is the number of workers in the Modern Sector, γ is the absorption
rate, and δ is the mortality rate. NM increases over time because new workers
are born into the Modern Sector, and because migrants arrive there from the
Traditional Sector. It is assumed that γ is higher than the fertility rate,
so there is excess capacity for the Modern Sector to absorb migrants. The
parameter γ represents the maximum rate at which new workers can be
absorbed. In other words, γ represents a teaching bottleneck. If the supply
of new workers is lower than γMM , then the lower number is absorbed.
When the Modern Sector is small, there are more potential migrants than
can possibly be absorbed into the Modern Sector, so the teaching constraint
is binding and Equation (3) holds. We will assume that γ is the same for all
countries, but δ is country-specific.
Let L be the total number of workers in the country. L grows as
dL
dt
= nL = (b− δ)L,
where n is the population growth rate and b is the fertility rate. We are
assuming that there is no childhood or retirement in this economy. Alterna-
tively, we are assuming that the number of workers is a fixed fraction of the
total population. This simplification serves the purpose of model building,
but we will need to be careful when calibrating the model to data.
Define p = NM/L to be the proportion of workers in the Modern Sector.
Combining the above two equations, we have
dp
dt
= (γ − b)p, (4)
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where γ is the same for all countries but b is country-specific. An immediate
implication of Equation (4) is that high fertility is detrimental to develop-
ment, at least when the Modern Sector is small. The reason is basic arith-
metic. The more young people there are, the more are turned away from the
Modern Sector for want of teachers. At the aggregate level, that translates
into a lower rate of growth of p.
Equation (4) cannot be true forever because at some point p will become
greater than 1, which is nonsensical. Intuition suggests that as p approaches 1
the supply of workers from the Traditional Sector shrinks, causing a decrease
in the rate of migration. We need a model of the Traditional Sector.
Let us assume that the Traditional Sector can absorb new workers, just like
the Modern Sector, but the only people being educated there are those born
there. Simply stated, nobody in the Modern Sector wants to move to the
Traditional Sector so that they can absorb traditional knowledge and suffer
a drop in income. Assume that the mortality rate in the Traditional Sector is
the same as that in the Modern Sector. Finally, assume that a fixed fraction
β of workers in the Traditional Sector are capable of migrating to the Modern
Sector during each unit of time.
The last assumption above can be justified in a manner similar to the justifi-
cation of a teaching bottleneck in the Modern Sector (see Introduction). Let
us imagine that in the Traditional Sector there is a system of education. It
might be formal, informal or even parental. Before a person can contemplate
migrating to the Modern Sector he or she must obtain some level of knowl-
edge from teachers in the Traditional Sector. If the number of teachers in the
Traditional Sector is a fixed fraction of the working population there, and
each teacher has a finite capacity for teaching, then the number of potential
migrants to the Modern Sector per unit time is a fixed faction of the number
of workers in the Traditional Sector.
Putting this all together, we have for the Traditional Sector
dNT
dt
= (n− β)NT , (5)
where NT is the number of workers in the Traditional Sector. The parameter
β represents the maximum rate at which people can leave the Traditional
Sector. If the Modern Sector is small, there may be insufficient capacity there
to absorb all potential migrants (as discussed earlier), in which case the rate
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of migration is lower than above. When the Modern Sector is large enough
to absorb all migrants, the above equation applies. Given that p = 1−NT /L,
we then have
dp
dt
= β(1− p). (6)
Equations (4) and (6) cannot both be true at the same time, except at one
particular value of p, which we will call pI . When p is small, the ability of
the Modern Sector to absorb new workers is the binding constraint on the
rate of migration. When p is large, the ability of the Traditional Sector to
supply new workers is the binding constraint. Putting (4) and (6) together,
we have
dp
dt
= min
[
(γ − b)p, β(1− p)]
=
{
(γ − b)p when p ≤ pI ,
β(1− p) otherwise, (7)
where pI is an inflection point given by pI = β/(β + γ − b). Equation (7)
describes an S-shaped path of economic development. The first stage is one of
accelerating migration, and the second stage is one of decelerating migration,
or convergence. Note that a condition for structural transformation to get
started is γ > b.
2.2 A Calibration
Figure 1 in the introduction showed a pattern of accelerating structural trans-
formation in China, consistent with Equation (3) and with the upper expres-
sion in Equation (7). Figure 3 presents the share of non-agricultural employ-
ment in Japan. It shows a pattern of deceleration that looks consistent with
the lower expression in Equation (7).
Given the examples of China and Japan, it is tempting to map the traditional
and Modern Sectors of the dual-economy model to the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors respectively. Anecdotally, such a mapping seams reason-
able given the oft-observed inequality between rural incomes and urban in-
comes in developing countries. There is a strong negative correlation between
overall per-capita income and the percentage of workers in agriculture.10 But
10See for example Figure 11 in Lucas (2009b).
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Figure 3: Percentage of workers outside of agriculture in Japan. Also shown is
the curve for the U.S., which is used in Equation (8) to normalize employment
shares in the dual-economy model. Source: ILO.
the mapping cannot be exact. Countries that are fully developed have small
agricultural sectors that are far from “Traditional”. Agricultural sectors
within developing countries contain a mix of subsistence farms and modern
farms.11 In order to calibrate our dual-economy model to employment-share
data we need to find a way to translate employment shares into p, taking
into account that there is a mix of traditional and modern agriculture.
A simple approach, consistent with an extreme vision of a dual economy,
comes to mind. Assume that the Traditional Sector is entirely agricultural.
Assume that the Modern Sector is a mini version of the United States, com-
plete with manufacturing, services, and modern agriculture. In particular,
assume that the share of employment in agriculture within the Modern Sector
is the same as in the United States. These assumptions can be formalized
as follows. Define p to be the share of employment in the Modern Sector
within a developing country. Define q to be the share of employment in non-
agricultural sectors. Finally, define qUSA to be the share of employment in
11Lewis (1954) offers the image of “highly capitalized plantations, surrounded by a sea
of peasants”.
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non-agricultural sectors in the U.S. Then q = p qUSA, or rearranging,
p =
q
qUSA
. (8)
For a given set of countries, we can use (8) to derive a set of curves p(t).
The curve of p(t) for Japan is concave and approaches the value of 1 as the
two curves in Figure 3 converge towards each other, reflecting the notion of
“catch-up growth” or “convergence growth”.12
The parameters γ and β in Equation (7) were calibrated using cross-country
regressions. The strategy was as follows. Countries were classified as being
either in the first stage of development or in the second stage. The method
by which this was accomplished is described below. For countries in the first
stage, the upper expression in (7) was tested by regressing growth rates of p
against fertility rates and checking whether the slope was near −1, as pre-
dicted. The parameter γ was then equated with the y-intercept. Growth
rates were defined to be the change in log-p over the historical interval, di-
vided by that interval. Fertility rates (net of infant mortality rates) were
averaged over the same interval, but lagged by 18 years in order to approxi-
mate worker entry rates.
For countries in the second stage of development, the following definition of
Migration Rate was used:
R =
p(tf )− p(ti)
tf − ti , (9)
where ti was the initial year in the historical period and tf was the final year.
Integrating the lower expression in Equation (7) we have
R =
1− e−β(tf−ti)
tf − t0 [1− p(ti)], (10)
which says that the migration rate should be a declining linear function of
the starting value of p, assuming a common interval of time. To test that
prediction, ti and tf were fixed for all stage-two countries. Migration rates
12The time series of qUSA used in Equation (8) is an exponential fit to the share of
U.S. workers in agriculture. The exponent is −0.03. It reflects increases in total factor
productivity in U.S. agriculture, assuming inelastic demand for food (see Wang & Ball,
2014).
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Country Class Stage Start p End p b Interval
China NIC 1 0.31 0.56 0.026 1978 - 2005
Thailand NIC 1 0.32 0.69 0.028 1978 - 2015
India NIC 1 0.38 0.55 0.031 1991 - 2015
Indonesia NIC 1 0.41 0.65 0.032 1978 - 2011
Philippines NIC 1 0.50 0.72 0.035 1978 - 2015
Turkey NIC 2 0.55 0.81 0.029 1991 - 2015
Brazil NIC 2 0.75 0.86 0.027 1991 - 2015
Poland OECD 2 0.77 0.90 0.017 1991 - 2015
Malaysia NIC 2 0.77 0.89 0.028 1991 - 2015
Mexico NIC 2 0.77 0.88 0.031 1991 - 2015
Greece OECD 2 0.80 0.88 0.013 1991 - 2015
Chile OECD 2 0.83 0.92 0.022 1991 - 2015
Portugal OECD 2 0.85 0.94 0.014 1991 - 2015
S. Korea OECD 2 0.86 0.96 0.019 1991 - 2015
S. Africa NIC 2 0.87 0.95 0.031 1991 - 2015
Latvia OECD 2 0.88 0.94 0.014 1991 - 2015
Ireland OECD 2 0.88 0.96 0.018 1991 - 2015
Table 1: Countries used to calibrate γ and β, in order of starting p. China
and Indonesia transitioned to stage two in 2005 and 2011 respectively. Data for
India is only available starting in 1991. Source: World Bank, ILO and author’s
calculations.
were then regressed against p(ti), and the slope measured. The parameter β
was then backed out of Equation (10). Finally, the fertility rate b was added
to the regression equation in order to test the prediction that migration rates
are independent of b for stage-two countries.
There are 195 countries in the world, but most countries are undeveloped so
are not good candidates for calibrating γ and β. “Western” countries such as
those in Western Europe or offshoots such as Canada and Australia are also
not good candidates because they underwent industrialization well before
employment-share statistics were collected in a systematic fashion. Of the
195 countries, only 17 can be definitively identified as having industrialized
during the last few decades. The list of 17 countries includes 10 that are
commonly classified as Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), as well as 7
from the list of OECD countries. The countries are listed in Table 1, along
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with the data used to calibrate γ and β.13
Figure 4 shows growth rates of p plotted against fertility rates for stage-one
countries. The slope of the solid line in Figure 4 has been set to −1, and the
R2 of the resulting fit is 0.92. The data strongly supports the demographic
prediction. The y-intercept of the solid line is 0.47, which we can equate with
γ.
Figure 5 shows migration rates for second-stage countries plotted against
starting values of p. As expected, the pattern is one of convergence. The
lower the starting value of p, the faster the rate of migration, as per Equation
(10). The slope of the best fit line is 0.22, which from (10) translates into
β = 0.031. When fertility rates are added to the regression, the resulting
coefficient is insignificant (t = 0.55, p value 0.59), confirming the prediction
that migration rates for second-stage countries are independent of fertility.
There is still the question of how countries were classified as stage one or
stage two. Some iteration was required. The criteria for a country to be
in stage one is that p ≤ pI for all years where pI = β/(β + γ − b) (see
Equation 7). Similarly, the criteria for a country to be in stage two is that
p > pI for all years. There is some circularity because calibrated values of γ
and β depend on the choice of countries, hence the need for some trial and
error. For the above set of countries, both criteria are satisfied. China and
Indonesia transitioned from stage one to stage two towards the end of the
interval. The post-transition data for those two countries is quite short, so
was simply discarded.
13The list of newly-industrialized countries was taken from
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newly industrialized country, which is based on an intersec-
tion of countries listed in Bozyk (2006), Guillen (2003), Waugh (2000) and Mankiw
(2007). For OECD countries see www.oecd.org. The years 1991 - 2015 were used for
stage-two countries to ensure full data coverage from ILO (www.ilo.org/ilostat) and to
have a common interval of time for calibrating Equation 10. The seven stage-two OECD
countries used for calibration had values of p less than 0.9 in 1991. The excluded OECD
countries (p > 0.9) were all advanced “Western” countries, including Australia, Canada,
Israel, New Zealand, Japan, and most of the Western European countries apart from
Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Also excluded were Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore
due to a lack of agricultural employment data in ILO. The latter two are city-states
so they get a pass. Fertility data was available back to 1960 from the World Bank
(data.worldbank.org). The lag of 18 years precluded employment shares earlier than 1978
from being used for stage-one countries.
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Figure 4: First-stage countries. The pattern conforms to the upper expression
in Equation (7). The R2 of the fit is 0.92. Source: data in Table 1 and author’s
calculations.
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Figure 5: Migration rates between 1991 and 2015 for second-stage countries. The
solid line is a best fit to all points except those with 1991 p value greater than 0.9
(R2 = 0.91). The latter represent “Western” countries and are shown only for
information purposes, but nevertheless are surprisingly close to the line. Source:
data in Table 1 and author’s calculations.
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In summary, the calibrated parameter values are as follows:
γ = 0.047,
β = 0.031.
(11)
3 A Model of Income Dynamics
I was observing the motion of a boat which was rapidly drawn
along a narrow channel by a pair of horses, when the boat sud-
denly stopped - not so the mass of water in the channel which it
had put in motion; it accumulated round the prow of the vessel
in a state of violent agitation, then suddenly leaving it behind,
rolled forward with great velocity, assuming the form of a large
solitary elevation, a rounded, smooth and well-defined heap of
water, which continued its course along the channel apparently
without change of form or diminution of speed. I followed it on
horseback, and overtook it still rolling on at a rate of some eight
or nine miles an hour, preserving its original figure some thirty
feet long and a foot to a foot and a half in height.
John Scott Russell (1845), discoverer of traveling waves.
This section presents a three-parameter model describing the transmission of
knowledge between workers having a variety of productivities. It builds on
the dual-sector model presented previously, expanding the number of produc-
tivity categories from two to infinity (a continuum), and adding stochastic
productivity shocks. The latter are required to sustain long-run steady-state
growth.
Two of the parameters, γ and β, have the same interpretation as in the dual-
sector model. They determine the speed at which knowledge is transmitted
between workers. The third parameter σ represents the volatility of produc-
tivity shocks. One of the main goals of this section is to test whether the
calibrated values of γ and β from Section 2.2 are compatible with the data
on U.S. income dynamics and growth. A successful test would support the
thesis that there is a common mechanism of knowledge diffusion operating
in developing countries and fully-developed countries.
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3.1 Empirical Preliminaries
Before presenting the model it is worth examining three qualitative features
of the empirical data on U.S. income dynamics that have bearing on the en-
deavor. The first is that American workers experience a lot of income-growth
volatility, some of it transient and some of it persistent. But there is an over-
all positive tendency, especially for those at the lower-end of the income
spectrum (Guvenen et al, 2015). This can be interpreted as being due to
job changes and learning. Low-income workers have more scope for positive
gains associated with learning from others than do high-income workers.
The second feature of the data is that income is positively correlated with age
across the entire spectrum of income, suggesting that workers become more
productive as they gain experience (Guvenen et al, 2015, Karahan & Ozkan,
2013, Toda, 2012). Toda regresses detrended log-income on age as well as
on years of education using a Mincer equation and finds that the shape of
the residual is independent of age. In particular, young people enter the
workforce with the same distribution of log-income as older workers, albeit
shifted left due to a lack of experience. We can interpret this finding to mean
that young entrants are randomly matched to older workers (e.g. managers)
whom they learn from. They earn the same income as their “teachers” less
an experience penalty. Their income then evolves deterministically due to
experience, and also randomly. The random shocks are partly due to jumps
associated with job-change and, presumably, learning from others. Given
that the age-dependent income drift does not survive death, it does not
contribute to long-run economic growth. So we can ignore the age-dependent
component of income dynamics and concentrate on the residual.
The third feature of the data is that the residual has a double-Pareto shape,
as shown in Figure 2 in the Introduction (Toda, 2012). A model of income
dynamics should be able to explain that shape.
3.2 The Model
Consider an economy in which there is only one factor of production, labor,
and income is equated with productivity. There is no land or capital. Let
x stand for log-income or log-productivity, and let Φ(x, t), x ∈ (−∞,+∞)
be the density of workers near x at time t. That is, the number of workers
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having log-productivity between between x and x+dx at time t is Φ(x, t)dx.
The integral of Φ over x is equal to the total number of workers L.
Let us postulate the following differential equation for Φ:
∂Φ
∂t
= (α− β + i− δ)Φ, (12)
where α and β are knowledge-diffusion parameters, i is the immigration rate,
and δ is the mortality rate. Equation (12) describes the “learning zone”, as
termed in the Introduction. The terms on the right-hand-side of this equation
are now described in turn:
αΦ This term represents a teaching bottleneck. Workers arrive through
two means. Either they are born and are randomly matched to workers
having productivity near x, whom they learn from. Or they arrive from
regions of lower productivity and learn from workers with productivity
near x. There is a maximum number of new workers that can be
absorbed per number of existing workers, regardless of the means by
which they arrive, and that maximum is α.
−βΦ There is flow βΦ of workers exiting the neighborhood of x in order
to move to higher productivity regions in x-space. The parameter β is
directly analogous to the parameter β used in section 2.1 to quantify the
flow of workers out of the Traditional Sector in a dual-sector economy.
+iΦ Immigration was not considered in the dual-economy model of devel-
opment, but is important for countries such as the United States. It is
assumed that the distribution of productivity of immigrants is the same
as that of natives, so they do not need to be taught upon arrival. This
strong assumption can be relaxed, but as we shall see later it seems to
be consistent with historical data for the U.S.
−δΦ There is a constant rate of mortality δ.
Define ρ(x, t) = Φ(x, t)/L to be the density of workers, normalized to a total
mass of 1. The number of workers grows as
dL
dt
= (b+ i− δ)L = nL,
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where b is the fertility rate and n is the growth rate of workers. Combining
the above with (12) we have
∂ρ
∂t
= (γ − b)ρ, (13)
where γ = α − β. The parameter γ is assumed to be positive. It is directly
analogous to the absorption rate of the Modern Sector in the dual-economy
model presented in Section 2.1.
Consider the case where γ − b > 0, as in the Modern Sector of the dual-
sector economy. The density is then growing exponentially, which cannot be
true for all regions of x, else the condition of normalization will be broken.
Equation (13) can only be valid in some limited region of x-space.
It is natural to assume that Equation (13) applies to regions where x is high,
because in those regions rational workers will crowd opportunities to improve
their productivity. Without specifying the precise process of matching be-
tween students and teachers, we can simply postulate that there is some level
of log-income, call it m, which divides x-space into two halves. Above m,
Equation (13) applies, whereas below m workers are leaving.
For x < m let us postulate the following
∂Φ
∂t
= (n − β)Φ =⇒ ∂ρ
∂t
= −βρ. (14)
The rationale for this equation is as follows. As in the upper region, new
workers are randomly matched to existing workers. As well, there is constant
mortality, and immigrants arrive with productivity similar to that of natives.
These worker flows account for the term nΦ. There is also exit of workers to
the region x ≥ m, which is captured by the term −βΦ.
Combining Equations (13) and (14) we have
∂ρ
∂t
=
{
(γ − b)ρ whenx ≥ m.
−βρ otherwise, (15)
The dividing point m is determined by the requirement that the flow of
workers out of the region x < m must balance the flow into the region
x ≥ m. In other words, the total mass must be conserved:
∂
∂t
∫
∞
−∞
ρ(x, t) dx =
∫
∞
−∞
∂ρ
∂t
dx = 0. (16)
23
If Equation (15) was all there was to economic dynamics, all workers would
eventually attain the maximum productivity, and economic growth would
stop. Let us now introduce some noise to keep the economy growing. Assume
that workers experience continuous Brownian shocks to their log-productivity
or log-income x over a time interval dt as follows
dx = σ dz, (17)
where σ is a constant and dz ∼ N(0, dt). Workers experiences shocks that
are independent of other worker’s shocks. One might also include a drift
parameter in the above but that would just add an exogenous influence that
has a trivial influence on the dynamics. The intuition around this equation is
that people experience fluctuations in their own productivity, and they also
experiences changes in income due to external influences such as fluctuating
costs of production.14 The choice of a Gaussian implies that very large shocks
are possible, which seems unrealistic. However simulation exercises show that
the exact form of the shocks does not matter to the overall dynamics, and
the Gaussian formulation provides analytic tractability.
Stochastic shocks described by (17) can be captured as follows:15
∂ρ
∂t
=
σ2
2
D2ρ, (18)
where D stands for the partial derivative with respect to x, D = ∂
∂x
. Com-
bining (18) with (15) we have the final form of the differential equation
∂ρ
∂t
=


(γ − b)ρ+ σ
2
2
D2ρ, when x ≥ m(t),
−βρ+ σ
2
2
D2ρ, otherwise,
(19)
where (16) determines the point m(t). Here we have included an explicit
time-dependence in m(t) to emphasize that the dividing point changes over
time. If one repeats the above derivation, this time assuming that immigrants
arrive with no knowledge and need to be taught in the same manner as young
entrants, the only change is that b in Equation (19) is replaced with b+ i.
14Harberger (1998) models growth as a process of real cost reduction. He shows that
cost increases are just as common as cost decreases.
15This is an application of the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation. See for example
Cox & Miller (1996).
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3.3 The Dual-Economy Model Revisited
In is now possible to recast the dual-economy model in terms of the income-
dynamics model described above. Define the cumulative fraction of workers
between X and ∞ to be
pX (t) =
∫
∞
X
ρ(x, t) dx.
Dropping the subscript X and integrating Equation (19) we have16
dp
dt
=


(γ − b)p− σ
2
2
Dρ|x=X when X ≥ m,
β(1− p) − σ
2
2
Dρ|x=X otherwise,
(20)
where Dρ|x=X is the first derivative of ρ evaluated at X. It has been assumed
that Dρ vanishes as x→ ±∞.
Let us imagine that X divides the log-income space into two sectors. Above
x = X is the Modern Sector, and below x = X is the Traditional Sector.
If the two sectors have disjoint income distributions, then ρ(X) = 0 and
Dρ(x)|x=X = 0 as well. Then Equation (20) is the same as the equation of
dynamics in the dual-economy model (Equation 7 in Section 2.1). Equality
of the two expressions in (20) occurs when X = m, which happens when
p = β/(β + γ − b). That is the transition point between the first stage and
second stage of development in the dual-economy model.
The dual-economy model is thus cast in a new light. The Modern Sector
is high-income, and the Traditional Sector is low income. When the seeds
of a Modern Sector are first planted in a country, m must lie somewhere to
the left of X. In that case the upper expression in (20) applies. But when
the Modern Sector grows to such an extent that m crosses X, the lower
expression in (20) starts to apply and the country enters the second phase of
transformation.
In reality, the distributions of income in the Traditional and Modern sectors
probably overlap, in which case Dρ(x)|x=X 6= 0. The term σ2/2Dρ|x=X
describes the flow of workers across the boundary due to stochastic effects.
16For X ≥ m integrate the upper expression in Equation (19). For X < m, define
q = 1− p and integrate the lower expression.
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Intuition would suggest that this quantity should be small compared to the
overall flow of workers from the Traditional sector to the Modern sector.17
Given that the dual-sector model can be derived from the model of income
dynamics, the calibrated values of γ and β listed in Equation (11) in Section
2.2 should be relevant to other applications of the income dynamics model,
including steady-state growth.
3.4 A Steady-State Growth Solution
If one simulates an economy described by Equation (19), starting with an
arbitrary initial shape for ρ, one sees an interesting phenomena.18 After an
initial period of time, the distribution rearranges itself into shape that is
similar to that seen in Figure 2. Both tails appear to follow power laws, as
seen in U.S. income data, and the mode of the distribution appears as a sharp
point similar to the residual of the Mincer Equation seen by Toda (2012).
The entire mass moves as a solid block, or traveling wave. The mean of the
distribution increases at a constant rate while the variance remains fixed. It
is worth formulating an analytic description of this traveling wave because it
may be a candidate for describing steady-state growth in developed countries.
In Equation (19) there are two regions. Within each region the differential
equation is second-order linear. There is a “birth/death” process in each
region and a discontinuity separating the two regions. These characteris-
tics remind one of Gabaix’s (2009) analysis of power laws, suggesting that
there are two power-law solutions, one for each region. We are looking for a
traveling wave solution, so let us try the following
ρ(x, t) =
{
A exp{−λII(x− gt)}, whenx ≥ gt,
A exp{λI(x− gt)}, otherwise,
(21)
17Numerical simulation using parameters calibrated later in this section confirm that
the stochastic boundary term is indeed small.
18Create a large number L of workers, say 100, 000. During each unit of time, do
the following. Add noise to the log-productivity x of each worker. Randomly select βL
students. Find the dividing point m such that α times the mass of workers having x > m
(the “learning zone”) equals βL. Randomly match teachers in the learning zone with
students from across the income spectrum (with the proviso that no student should see a
drop in income) setting the values of x of the students to be equal to the values of x of
their teachers.
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where λI and λII are the two power-law exponents (here written in terms
of exponential functions because we are working in log-income space), g is
the speed of the wave (the growth rate of income), and A is a normalizing
constant. The boundary point is gt, which is the value of x where the two
solutions match. Both expressions have the same coefficient A to ensure that
the expressions are equal at x = gt. A can be determined by the requirement
that the integral of ρ over x must be equal to 1, which gives us
A =
λI λII
λI + λII
.
It can be verified that Equation (16) is then automatically satisfied. Substi-
tuting (21) into (19) we get
0 = γ − b− gλII + σ
2
2
λ2II ,
0 = −β + gλI + σ
2
2
λ2I .
(22)
Assuming that the parameters γ, β, σ and b are known, there are three
unknowns, g, λI and λII . But there are only two equations above. For any
value of g there is a solution for λI and λII . So any value of g is permitted.
However when one simulates the model, a single definite speed is observed!
This type of situation, in which the speed of a traveling wave is mathe-
matically ambiguous, has been the subject of investigation by mathematical
biologists and biophysicists working on problems of gene propagation and
microbial evolution. It turns out that partial differential equations are not
the whole story. Differential equations assume continuity, but in the far
reaches of the tails the number of elements (e.g. workers) is small and there
are stochastic effects that require a different treatment. The interaction be-
tween those stochastic effects and continuous dynamics in the body give rise
to stability issues, and there is only one viable speed.19 The upper tail has
received more attention in the literature than the lower tail, so in order to
make links with that literature our focus is also on the upper tail.
19Fisher, a biophysicist, discusses traveling waves of fitness seen in microbial populations
and offers the amusing analogy of the random snuffing of an exploring dog’s nose. “The
balance between the irregular snuﬄing and the inertial motion of the body determine the
overall speed; yet, as the owner of a large, headstrong dog knows, predicting its speed is
very hard!” (Fisher, 2011).
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A mathematical trick borrowed from Tsimring et al (1996) can be used to
express g in terms of the other parameters. Define the following transformed
variables
x˜ =
√
2(γ − b)
σ
x
t˜ = (γ − b) t
(23)
Substituting these into the upper expression in (19) (x ≥ m(t)), all the
parameters cancel and we end up with
∂ρ
∂t˜
= ρ+
∂2ρ
∂x˜2
. (24)
In the frame of reference defined by (23) the wave travels at some speed, call
it c, which is unrelated to the parameters γ, β and σ. Transforming back to
original coordinates (x, t), the speed g must be
g = σ
√
γ − b
2
c.
It remains to find c.
Equation (24) shows up as a limiting expression for the upper tail of distri-
butions covering disparate nonlinear phenomena having traveling-wave solu-
tions. The most famous example is gene propagation, originally described by
Fisher (1937) using what is now known as the Fisher-Kolomgorov equation.
Fisher analyzed stochastic behavior in the far right tail of his system, which
happened to be described by Equation (24), and found that c = 2 was the
only speed that leads to stable wave propagation, in which the stochastic
fluctuations at the leading edge move at the same speed as the body of the
distribution.20 Fisher presented his argument in a verbally terse manner. It
is reproduced in the Appendix in a more explicit mathematical form.
Substituting c = 2 into the above formula for g we have
g = σ
√
2(γ − b). (25)
20Kolmogorov et al. (1937) were investigating various biological and chemical systems
and obtained the same result. Van Saarloos (1987) analyses the stability properties of
these systems using modern mathematical techniques. Grindrod (1996) provides a good
overview of these types of systems.
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A condition for growth is that γ > b, which was also the condition for
structural transformation to occur in the dual economy model. Note that if
we had included a drift term in (17) the above formula for the growth rate
would have simply included that extra term, but as we will see below, that
does not seem to be necessary.
Equation (25) implies that the growth rate of income in developed countries
is an increasing function of σ and γ and a decreasing function of b. The
positive dependence on σ makes intuitive sense. The higher the standard
deviation of shocks, the greater the magnitude of positive shocks, which are
the focus of attention of knowledge seekers. The positive dependence on
γ also makes intuitive sense because the higher the rate of absorption the
faster rate of knowledge transmission. The negative dependence of g on b
is a bottleneck effect. When the fertility rate increases, the additional new
workers make new demands on teachers, causing the vertex in Figure 2 to be
shifted to left (m is lower). The average quality of knowledge transmitted to
students is then lower.
3.5 Testing the Steady-State Growth Solution
In this section, the model of steady-state growth is calibrated to U.S. growth
and income data, with the goal of testing for consistency with the dual-
economy model. The steady-state growth model has four parameters, γ, β, b
and σ. The fertility rate b can be directly extracted from U.S. demographic
data. The other three parameters can be calibrated to the observed growth
rate of income and the Pareto exponents of the U.S. income distribution:21
b = 0.0185,
g = 0.0206,
λI = 1.25,
λII = 2.25.
(26)
21The fertility rate b is the average over the decades 1950s to 1990s from Haines (2008).
The growth rate g is the average of growth rates of real income per capita between 1968
and 2014 (adding eighteen years to account for childhood) from the Penn World Table
(Feenstra et al, 2015). The values of λI and λII are the midpoints of the ranges 1 - 1.5
and 2 - 2.5 respectively from Table 1 in Toda (2014).
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Calibrated Parameter γ β σ
Steady-State Growth Model 0.042 0.033 0.096
Dual-Economy Model 0.047 0.031
Table 2: Consistency of knowledge-diffusion parameters.
These values can be used in Equations (22) and (25) to back out σ, γ and β,
which are shown in Table 2 (top row).
Table 2 shows a marked degree of consistency in the values of γ and β between
the steady-state growth model and the dual-economy model, suggesting a
common mechanism of knowledge diffusion driving growth in industrializing
countries and the United States. The calibrated value of σ is close to the value
of 0.1 estimated by Karahan & Ozkan (2013) to be the minimum volatility
of persistent income shocks over the life cycle of U.S. workers.
The steady-state growth model has been assumed to apply to the United
States since World War II. Going back further in time, one sees that the
growth rate was somewhat lower. The average growth rate of real income
during the nineteenth century was about 1.5% per year, while for the twen-
tieth century it was about 2% per year (Maddison, 2009). According to the
growth-rate formula (25), an increase in the growth rate would be expected
if the fertility rate had been dropping.
Figure 6 shows that the fertility rate has indeed been dropping in the U.S.
since at least 1850 (Haines, 1994, 2008). The dashed line shows the total
“entry rate”, which includes immigration. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
shows that the drop in the fertility rate can explain the rise in the growth
rate. Differentiating Equation (25) with respect to b, the elasticity of growth
with respect to fertility is −σ2/g. Using σ = 0.096 from Table 2, g = 0.02
and a slope of ∆b = −0.133% per decade (fit to the solid line in Figure 6),
the prediction is that the growth rate should have been increasing by 0.059%
per decade, or just over half a percent over one hundred years. That estimate
is close to the observed increase in g between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries according to Maddison’s data.22
22According to Maddison’s data, there is also a negative correlation between growth rates
and fertility rates post-WWII across other Western countries. However some of that may
be due to capital investment after the war. Even a simple Solow-Swan model predicts
a negative correlation between growth rates and fertility rates during the transition to
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Figure 6: The decline in U.S. fertility and immigration by decade, 1850-2010.
Each point represents the decade forward from that year. Source: Haines (1994,
2008).
Recall that an assumption of the income-dynamics model in Section 3.2 was
that immigrants do not have to be taught upon first arrival. An alternative
version of the model assumes that immigrants are like young entrants to the
job market, in which case the parameter b must include the immigration
rate. Repeating the back-of-the-envelope calculation using this alternative
specification, one obtains a predicted rate of increase in g of 0.079% per
decade, which is too high. Figure 7 shows a more exact comparison of the
two alternative model predictions (back-casts). The version of the model
that includes immigration seriously underestimates growth rates in the mid-
nineteenth century. It seems that immigrants to the United States did not
take up space as students in the “classrooms” of their adopted country upon
arrival. They were teachers.
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Figure 7: Testing the growth formula g = σ
√
2(γ − b). Each point represents the
decade forward from that year. The version of model where b reflects just fertility
is more consistent with the historical data than the version where b also captures
immigration.
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Figure 8: Growth rate g vs number of workers L. Steady-state parameters are
from Table 2. For each choice of L the growth rate is averaged over 100 seeds of
the random number generator.
3.6 The Scale Effect
The growth rate formula g = σ
√
2(γ − b) is only valid in the continuum
limit. When the number of workers is finite the growth rate is lower, so
there is a scale effect but it is bounded from above. There are no analytic
expressions for these types of scale effects available in the literature, but the
effect can be measured using simulation.23
Figure 8 shows the result of the simulation exercise. When the number of
workers L is small, the growth rate is approximately linear in L. This shows
up as a convex curve in Figure 8 because of the log scale. The linearity
of g with L is intuitive: the more people there are making discoveries, the
higher the growth rate. But when L becomes large, the finite rate of diffusion
overwhelms the effect of having more innovators. There is much reinventing
of wheels going on, or “stepping on toes” as Bloom et al. (2017) put it. The
teaching bottleneck puts a brake on the scale effect.
steady-state growth.
23Staley (2011) explores some analytic approximations available in the literature.
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Scale effects have been a topic of lively discussion in the endogenous growth
literature. The earliest versions of endogenous growth models exhibited
strong scale effects in which the growth rate is proportional to the level of
population. Jones’ (1995) critique of those models prompted the development
of second-generation models that eliminated that prediction. According to
Jones (1999), there are two broad approaches to eliminating the strong scale
effect. The first posits a growing number of sectors such that the number of
people in each sector is constant. The second assumes that it is getting harder
to find new ideas (Bloom et al., 2017, update this argument). The current
model suggests another approach to eliminating the strong scale effect, which
does not assume an expanding number of sectors, nor an increasing level of
difficulty in finding new ideas.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, a unified model of economic growth and development based on
knowledge diffusion has been presented. Two of the parameters γ and β de-
scribe knowledge diffusion, while a third, σ, describes stochastic productivity
shocks. A simplified version of the model containing only γ and β describes
the process of structural transformation in developing countries. The two
parameters have been calibrated to historical employment-share data cover-
ing countries that have industrialized since World War II. A second version
of the model containing all three parameters describes steady-state growth.
That model has been calibrated to the shape and speed of the U.S. income
distribution.
The main result of the paper is that the calibrated values of the knowledge-
diffusion parameters γ and β are similar in the two versions of the model,
implying a common mechanism of knowledge diffusion operating in devel-
oping countries and fully-developed countries. Or turning this around, the
model of economic growth presented in this paper is consistent with the
expectation that learning behavior is similar across countries.
The model of structural transformation predicts that the rate of transfor-
mation is hindered by high fertility during the first (accelerating) stage of
migration, reflecting a teaching bottleneck, but not during the second (de-
celerating) stage. That prediction is supported by the data. The model
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of steady-state growth predicts a negative correlation between fertility and
income growth, which is supported by U.S. data going back to the mid-
nineteenth century.
Some possible avenues for future work include the following. On the empirical
side, the model could be tested against historical income-distribution data in
developing countries, rather than relying on employment share data. Income
distribution data for developing countries is sparse in comparison with U.S.
data, but is becoming more available (see for example Wu & Perloff, 2004,
Sala-i-Martin, 2006, Chotikapanish et al, 2007). On the theoretical side,
work could be done to endogenize the parameters γ, β and σ in terms of
rational behavior. Lastly, there remains the question of why, in some coun-
tries, knowledge becomes available to the masses, while in other countries it
is hoarded, or does not exist.
A Fisher’s Explanation for c=2
Fisher’s (1937) explanation for c = 2 is rather terse. Given the central
importance of his result it is worth spelling out his explanation in some
detail. Equation (24) without the tildes reads
∂ρ
∂t
= ρ+
∂2ρ
∂x2
. (27)
The power-law solution can be written as
ρ = A exp [−λ(x− ct)],
where A is a constant, λ is the power-law exponent, and c is the speed of the
traveling wave. Substituting this solution into (27) we have
c =
1
λ
+ λ,
which is a U-shaped function with minimum at λ = 1 corresponding to
c = 2. Fisher showed that this minimum speed is the only speed consistent
with stochastic behavior in the far-right tail.
Let us imagine that at the leading edge some worker leaves the pack due
to a stochastic shock to productivity and ends up at x = x0. The density
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function describing this person is initially a delta-function centered on x0,
but spreads out due to subsequent stochastic shocks. The amplitude of the
density also grows at the rate et due to the teaching of others. The variance
of this localized group of workers grows as 2t (recall Equation 18), hence the
density evolves as
ρ(x, t) =
1√
4pit
exp
{
−(x− x0)
2
4t
}
et. (28)
It can be verified that this expression satisfies Equation (27).
Imagine a point xr located somewhere to the right of x0 such that the count
of workers to the right of xr is q. Note that xr is a function of q, xr(q). The
subscript r stands for “right tail”. Let us further imagine that as the wave
expands and grows in amplitude, xr moves to the right in such a manner
that q stays constant. If the resulting speed of xr matches the speed of the
power-law distribution then the traveling wave will keep its shape. Hence in
order to find the stable traveling wave speed c it suffices to find the speed
of xr such that q is constant. The path followed by xr as a function of t is
implicitly defined by
q =
∫
∞
xr
ρ(y, t) dy (for any q with 0 < q < 0.5),
where ρ is defined in (28). Substituting z = (y−x0)/
√
2t (the distance from
x0 to y in units of standard deviation) we have
q = et
∞∫
zr=
xr−x0√
2t
1√
2pi
e−z
2/2 dz,
which is now expressed in terms of the cumulative standard normal distribu-
tion. There is no analytic expression for this integral, but an expansion in
1/zr can be obtained via integration by parts. Rewrite the integral as∫
∞
zr
1
z
1√
2pi
ze−z
2/2 dz.
Integrating by parts this becomes
1
zr
√
2pi
e−z
2
r/2 −
∫
∞
zr
1
z2
1√
2pi
e−z
2/2 dz.
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The second term above can be further integrated by parts to obtain a term
in 1/z2r , and so on. If we restrict attention to the far-right tail then to first
order in 1/zr we have
q = et
1
zr
√
2pi
e−z
2
r/2.
Substituting zr = (xr − x0)/
√
2t and taking logarithms,
0 = 4t2 − (xr − x0)2 − 4t ln(
√
2piq) + 2t ln(2t)− 4t ln(xr − x0).
As xr and t become large only the first two terms on the RHS of the above
expression survive, hence
xr → x0 + 2t,
so the speed approaches 2.
This finding is not dependent on the choice of q (0 < q < 0.5) and, hence,
the entire profile for xr > x0 moves at this speed. A similar argument can
be made for xr < x0. Therefore, an initial profile ρ(x, 0) will approach a
traveling wave as time grows, moving with speed c = 2.
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